Every service in the platform, and every Vavelio component at the edge, runs on the same custom kernel family. Two flags, one factory, one law: TUK is the platform's kernel, restricted to the platform by name; VUK is the same kernel serving everything external. The separation is a naming law — and it is enforced.
| the rule | what it means |
|---|---|
| One service per machine | One image per service, baked by one factory from a pinned manifest — an image is exactly its content, or it does not boot. |
| UEFI with Secure Boot, our own key set | Every machine boots on enrolled keys we minted ourselves, out of setup mode — no third-party keys anywhere in the chain. |
| Identity minted in hardware | Machine identity keys are minted inside the module, sign-only, and never leave it — there is no export path to defend. |
| An authority class in every image | The class is hash-bound into the image itself, so an image cannot claim a class it was not built with — a platform image cannot claim to be the court's. |
The hardware keystore is an upgrade, never a boot gate. Lost keys are re-issued, not a brick.
A guest holds no writable state volumes. State lives in the engine, where it is kept forever.
A machine reports readiness over its serial contract before it may serve. A silent boot is an incident.
A machine whose certificate does not match its role is a visible anomaly, not a hidden one.
The Tartarus platform's kernels. Restricted to the platform by law; a platform image is what it says it is, or it does not boot.
The same kernel for Vavelio's external components — the edge proxies, the portal. Same factory, same boot chain, same custody; the flag names the domain, and the domain is enforced in the image.
One kernel family. The flag is not a fork — it is a boundary the image itself is built to hold.
| mechanism | the attack class it removes |
|---|---|
| Our own Secure Boot key set | supply-chain bootkits. |
| Authority class hash-bound into the image | masquerade and forged identity. |
| Sign-only hardware-minted keys | key exfiltration. |
| Zero writable guest volumes | persistence and resident malware. |
| Factory-baked pinned manifests | image drift. |
| The boot-to-ready contract | silent failure. |
| Manifest-verified restart — measured at 0.134 s [published] | unbounded downtime. |
The order these kernels serve is in the Constitution & Laws; the system they run is on the Architecture page; the restart number and every measured claim are on Metrics, with their basis.